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BELIEVING THE WORD: 
A PROPOSAL ABOUT KNOWING OTHER PERSONS 
Phillip Cary 
Our concept of knowing of other persons ought to include respect for them. 
Since respect implies considering whether what they say is true, I propose that 
believing others' words is a necessary condition of knowing them. I explore the 
contribution such belief makes to knowledge of other persons, as well as some 
surprising but welcome implications, including theological consequences. 
There is a common picture of how we know other persons that ought 
to be replaced. It is a picture of penetration: we read others' words 
and gestures, facial expressions and tone of voice, as outward signs 
of inner states, thus penetrating through the outer shell to the inner 
core of the person. There is something violent about this picture; 
surely, knowing another person requires more respect for externals 
than that. 
A better picture is available, I think, in the Christian theological tra-
dition, though so far it has only been applied to our knowledge of 
God. Its roots go back to Old Testament talk about hearing the word 
of God. The picture is of receiving the other's word into our hearts, 
that it may dwell there and transform us. Instead of piercing outer 
walls to enter an inner space, we let a truth which comes to us from 
outside enter us and change our thoughts. The other we desire to 
know is not hidden inner territory to penetrate into, but rather some-
one who can give himself to be known by his speech. Hence knowl-
edge of him is not so much an achievement of the knower as a gift 
bestowed by the known. Since human persons are made in the image 
of God, it makes sense to try applying this picture to our knowledge 
of one another. 
In what follows I shall unpack the contrast between these two pic-
tures in less pictorial terms. I shall begin by attempting to put my finger 
on what is wrong with the first picture-where it gets its aura of vio-
lence (I). This diagnosis of the bad picture will lead to a proposal 
designed to catch the gist of the good picture. After briefly articulating 
this proposal in contemporary epistemological terms (II), I shall explore 
some of its implications, in the process heading off a few objections (III). 
At the end, I return to the proposal's place of origin and discuss some 
theological implications (IV). 
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1. Respecting the Other 
The picture I am commending originates historically in a theological 
account of the nature of Christian faith: the conviction is that we know 
God by believing his word. To believe someone's word is to believe that 
it is true-and that already shows us what is wrong with the bad pic-
ture. If knowing other persons were a matter of reading outward 
expressions as signs of inner states, then it would be irrelevant whether 
the outward expressions were true: all that would matter is that they 
conveyed the person's thoughts or feelings, directly or indirectly. The 
project of knowing other persons could proceed without ever recogniz-
ing the other as responsible for speaking the truth or saying things that 
make a claim on us. This accounts for the aura of violence in the bad 
picture: to penetrate through the externals is to ignore an indispensable 
locus of truth, responsibility, and ethical claims. 
We can illustrate this point by concocting a rather nightmarish (but 
by no means impossible) scenario, and then reflecting on the way many 
of its elements are present in everyday life. Imagine two prison psychol-
ogists observing a "subject" behind a one-way mirror. They are trying 
to help this person: with the right diagnosis, they feel they can provide 
appropriate therapy for his anti-social behavior. They are also testing a 
new technique for uncovering hidden pathologies: they observe their 
subject in isolation from all human contact, confined for months to a sin-
gle room that is always well-lit, where everything he does is recorded 
from behind the mirror. 
The prisoner is fully cognizant of this therapeutic strategy, and he 
knows a one-way mirror when he sees it. It is not hard to imagine the 
sort of thing he might say, addressing himself to the observers behind the 
mirror: "You have no right to do this to me. I am a human being, for 
God's sake! And I haven't done anything to deserve this. Besides, I have 
rights, and you're violating them." But of course there is no response. 
The observers listen to his words and try to determine whether they 
express, say, veiled aggression or a desire to be nurtured. Predictably, as 
the weeks go by the prisoner's discourse becomes less rational. Whining 
and begging alternate with outbursts of childish rage. The psychologists 
observe this with satisfaction: the barriers of rationalization are coming 
down, and the underlying pathology is beginning to emerge. 
At this point, we can imagine one psychologist turning to speak to the 
other and beginning: "My hypothesis is that...." This is a moment worth 
thinking about. Here is a speaker who is assured of receiving a different 
kind of hearing than the subject on the other side of the mirror. She can 
take for granted that her colleague will consider whether her words are 
true. This does not mean he will necessarily agree with her, but he will 
place her words in a category from which he rigorously excludes the 
prisoner's: he will treat them as truth-bearers, things which can bear the 
predicates "false" or "true." He need not actually deny that the prison-
er's words also could be true or false, but the point is that is simply an 
irrelevant consideration for his diagnostic purposes. Indeed it might dis-
rupt the procedures of clinical observation if he were to wonder whether 
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utterances like "You have no right to do this to me" were true. 
Something quite like this style of clinical observation can take place 
without one-way mirrors or coercion. The Freudian dictum "No means 
Yes" taught psychoanalysts to regard a patient's utterances as symp-
toms rather than attend to their semantic meaning or truth-value. I Nor 
does one have to be a psychoanalyst to listen to people this way. There 
is a more ancient "type," the courtier, the manipulator, the 
Machiavellian of the social life, whose motive in getting others talking is 
to unearth their secret wishes and fears. This is a role that many of us 
have played from time to time-listening to others not in order to learn 
what they have to say for themselves, but in the hope that they will 
inadvertently or incautiously give themselves away. 
This, I propose, is not what we ought to mean by "knowing another 
person." My proposal has an ethical basis in the claim that we ought not 
to give the title "knowing another person" to a form of knowledge 
which does not respect the other as person. (I shall refer to this as "the 
requirement of respect" and I take it to be an ethical obligation). I take it 
for granted that a form of observation or listening that leaves out of con-
sideration the truth-values of another's speech is disrespectful of the 
other as person. 
I do not mean to say there is nothing we can learn by such methods. I 
shall however use the common vernacular distinction and label this dis-
respectful sort of observation, a way of "knowing about" other persons 
rather than of knowing them-or, equivalently, a form of knowledge 
about them rather than knowledge of them. In other languages we could 
make the distinction more unmistakable by using the word connaftre 
rather than savoir, or kennen rather than wissen. 2 The point is that we 
may learn a great deal about people by observing them behind one-way 
mirrors, but this is not the sort of thing we usually mean by saying we 
know them, and (I propose) this is not the sort of thing we ought to mean 
when we say we know them. The prison psychologists are wrong to say 
that they know their "subject." 
II. The Truth of the Other 
At this point we already have a necessary condition of knowledge of 
another person: it requires giving heed to the truth-values of the other's 
discourse. But because false utterances are not likely to provide the 
basis for such knowledge, I shall venture the stronger proposal that 
knowing other persons requires believing what they say is true. We 
need not believe everything they say, of course, but if we never regard 
anything they say as true then we cannot know them. Hence, more 
strictly put, the proposal is this: it is a necessary condition of knowledge 
of another person that the knower believe some of what the other person 
says. 
This is plainly not a definition, nor anything close to a full account of 
the rich and complex phenomena of interpersonal knowledge. Much 
more goes into knowing other persons than just believing what they say. 
In particular, many pieces of knowledge about other persons (gained by 
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observation, inference, testimony, etc.) doubtless contribute to knowl-
edge of other persons. In fact, we shall soon find reason to think that 
some specific kinds of knowledge about other persons are also necessary 
conditions of knowledge of other persons-a finding that is after all 
hardly surprising. 
It bears mentioning, then, that not all knowledge about other persons 
is disrespectful and violent-quite the contrary. Such knowledge can 
broaden and deepen our knowledge of another person when it is incor-
porated into a relationship that includes listening to the other person 
and attending to the truth of what she says. What my proposal is 
intended to exclude is knowledge that arises in contexts where such lis-
tening is absent. The point is that where the truth of the other's dis-
course is given no hearing, respect for the other as person is lacking, and 
therefore knowledge of the other as person is impossible. 
This requirement of respect is more than just a stipulation setting lim-
its on what deserves to be called "knowledge of other persons." It also 
indicates that believing others makes a positive contribution to knowing 
them. We need to consider next how that contribution is made. 
It is not hard to see how believing another person's words could fit a 
very common conception of knowledge: justified true belief. If a person 
speaks the truth, and we have good reason to believe she knows what 
she's talking about, and moreover we have good reason to believe she is 
trustworthy, then believing what she says is a true belief grounded in 
good reasons-a form of knowledge, by most accounts.' Of course, it 
may not be a way of knowing her (if for instance she is giving a paper on 
the latest research in molecular biology). The kind of utterance in which 
she could make herself known must be self-referential or self-involving 
in some way. But such utterances are not far to seek-persons often 
describe themselves, tell us what they want, share their fears, confess 
their faults, dwell on their hopes, and so on. 
On this score there is in fact an embarrassment of riches-an enor-
mous variety of ways that persons make themselves known in what they 
say. To get at the conceptual issues underlying the present proposal I 
need to consider a paradigmatic example of this. A fair amount follows 
from the choice of paradigm, which inevitably leaves some aspects of 
human life in the background and puts others front and center. My 
choice naturally reflects my convictions about what is important and 
valuable about our lives with each other. 
Once again I shall be guided by the original theological model for my 
proposal, which takes the Gospel promise of grace in Christ as the word 
of God which we are to believe. This promise is the keystone of an over-
arching covenant between the Lord God and Israel, the people he takes 
for his own and loves as a husband loves his bride. The words of the 
covenant, the wedding vow which unites this couple, are "You will be 
my people and I will be your God."4 So I will take as a paradigm the 
giving of a promise such as a wedding vow. I cannot think of a better 
example of persons giving themselves to be known in their words. The 
question then is: how does this happen? How does such a promise give 
us knowledge of the promisor? 
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If the bad picture were our only option we would have to give an 
answer like: by revealing the feelings of her heart. But simply on 
empirical grounds, this answer is implausible. Too many good mar-
riages have begun with two terrified people making their vows despite 
uncertainties and even active misgivings. Their wedding vows failed to 
reveal these misgivings, but nonetheless gave both of them an abiding 
reason to trust that they knew their partner-knew what their partner 
would do and be in the future. 
For of course a wedding vow is not a report on one's feelings, but a 
promise to act and live a certain way from henceforth. The truth condi-
tions of an utterance like "I will be your God" or "I will love and honor 
you" are fulfilled not by how the speaker is feeling at the moment but by 
what he proceeds to do for the rest of his life. Thus the promise itself 
directs our attention away from the feelings of the moment and toward 
the new life that it describes. For what makes the promise true is not 
how the promisor feels but how he proceeds to act. 
In order for the promise to be a source of knowledge it must be true, 
in the sense that its truth-conditions are fulfilled by what the promisor 
subsequently does. This is truth in the bald semantic sense: "I will love 
and honor you" is true if and only if the speaker proceeds to love and 
honor the one to whom he speaks.s But by the same token this truth 
depends not on correspondence with facts already established but on 
what the speaker proceeds to do. The truth of the promise is thus up to 
the promisor. He gives himself to be known by keeping his word. Thus 
wedding vows are the basis of knowledge of other persons precisely to 
the extent that the partners do what they say. 
This does not mean that the promisors' feelings are simply irrelevant. 
They are as relevant as feelings always are to actions. But a predictable 
pattern of action such as is promised in a wedding vow is tied to reliable 
patterns of feeling, which are in turn tied to settled dispositions, habits 
and traits of character. That is why keeping one's promise depends 
much less on the feelings of the moment than on virtues of character 
such as faithfulness and integrity. Even a feeling such as sincere resolve 
(if we may treat this as an episodic feeling rather than a disposition of 
character) is of less consequence in a fickle and thoughtless person than 
in a faithful one. 
The relevant connection here is brought out by a lovely ambiguity in 
the word "true." In addition to the bald semantic sense (as when we say 
that a particular sentence is true) the word has an ethical sense, as when 
we say that a person is "faithful and true." The two senses are related, 
for of course a sentence is more likely to be true if it is the utterance of a 
person who is true to his word. English and Hebrew and many other 
languages use the word "true" or its equivalent in both the ethical and 
the semantic sense, with the former probably the earlier and more basic 
sense of the term. For outside of academic contexts (or more broadly, 
contexts of scientific inquiry) the question of truth will typically be a 
question about whose word can be believed. 
Belief in another's word is true if her word is true, and justified if 
there are good reasons for believing that she is true to her word. When 
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what we want to know is another person, the justification of our belief 
turns on the truth of that person. If we have faith in her, our beliefs 
about her will depend on what she says about herself, and if she is the 
kind of person who keeps her word it will be no accident that these 
beliefs are true. To that extent, the certainty of our knowledge of other 
persons varies not with our perceptiveness but with the faithfulness of 
the one we wish to know. A more faithful person is more knowable, 
because she is more capable of giving herself to be known in a trustwor-
thy and reliable way. 
Perceptiveness is called for, however, in the judgement that a particu-
lar person actually is faithful or trustworthy. Such judgment stands in 
need of justification, because it is no good to bestow one's trust on just 
anybody, nor should we believe whatever anyone tells us, as if all per-
sons were faithful and true. This is perhaps the most important reason 
why belief in what other persons say is necessary but not sufficient for 
knowing them. A well-grounded trust in another person's words 
requires reasons for believing the person trustworthy. 
As the Biblical model again shows us, these reasons will typically take 
the form of a narrative. We say things like, "he is faithful and true-
look at the kind of thing he does" and then launch into a story that illus-
trates his faithfulness, like the Passover Haggadah or the Passion 
Narrative. If the Lord God really is the one who "has helped his servant 
IsraeL.as he promised to our father Abraham and his seed forever,"6 
then he is one who can be trusted with our lives. 
Sometimes we are eyewitnesses of the stories that go to show a per-
son's truthfulness, but often we must trust the testimony of others. So 
the project of knowing another person typically involves us in a web of 
trust and testimony, dependent on the truth of many other persons. The 
dialogue in which one person gives himself to be known by another is 
sustained in various ways by the community, as an individual's faith in 
the word of God could not exist without the witness of prophets and 
apostles, who not only give voice to the word of God but also bear wit-
ness to his faithfulness. The Christian faith is without justification if 
their witness is not trustworthy, just as it is without truth if God is not 
true to his word. 
III. The Authority of the Other 
Under my proposal, the knowledge of other persons must be treated 
in connection with the epistemology of belief in testimony, for it is logi-
cally dependent on what people say about themselves, i.e. their testimo-
ny concerning themselves. Furthermore, we must often rely on the testi-
mony of third parties concerning another person's truthfulness. This not 
only situates our knowledge of other persons in relationships of trust 
and respect, but also makes it radically dependent on the things other 
persons choose to say and do. This I believe is as it should be: knowl-
edge of other persons ought to depend on attributes that are unique to 
persons and therefore of distinctively ethical significance, such as choice 
and action. However, this dependence has striking implications that are 
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likely to take us by surprise, because they conflict with intuitions about 
the nature of knowledge that have deep roots in the Western tradition. 
For the sake of contrast, consider an epistemic context where belief in 
testimony is not entirely appropriate. A student may believe the 
Pythagorean theorem because his math teacher tells him so, having 
good reasons for thinking she knows what she's talking about and is 
telling the truth. We might even deign to call this "knowledge," as so 
much of our knowledge of mathematics and the natural sciences is of 
this kind (many of us know Godel's proof or the theory of relativity in 
just this way, for instance). However, we will surely say that this is not 
really understanding the Pythagorean theorem, Godel's proof, or the the-
ory of relativity. It is important (we tell our students and ourselves) "to 
see it for yourself." 
The notion that real understanding is something like seeing with your 
own eyes rather than believing what you hear has roots that go way back 
in the Western philosophic tradition, to the Platonist notion of noesis or 
intel/eetus as the vision of the mind's eye, and in modern times to 
Descartes' notion that real certainty requires the clarity and distinctness 
of a purely mental inspection-the kind we give to a mathematical proof 
when we check each step to be absolutely sure it's righe This is a notion 
that makes good sense when applied to mathematics, but not when 
applied to the knowledge of persons. In mathematics we must often 
begin by believing the authoritative testimony of our teachers telling us 
of things we do not yet understand, in order ultimately to reach the goal 
of seeing for ourselves. But in knowing other persons such a goal is inco-
herent and unethical, because there is no getting around the authority of 
the person known, her right to speak for herself and have a say about 
how she is to be known. Hence in contrast to mathematics there is in the 
interpersonal realm no more perfect and certain form of knowledge than 
that based on belief in authoritative testimony. 
The authority we must believe in, in order to know other persons, is 
the authority of the person to be known. Knowing other persons is thus 
logically dependent on the authority,as well as the truthfulness of the 
known. The authority of the known consists in the fact that persons can-
not be known as persons unless they give themselves to be known by 
saying something true about themselves. This epistemic limitation is not 
something to be regretted, but an ethical feature of persons that ought to 
be honored and respected. It means that persons have the freedom to 
make themselves known or not, as they choose. We cannot know others 
without their say-so, and the attempt to do so is a kind of violence. 
Because persons have this freedom, we are dependent on their author-
ity and truthfulness if we wish to know them. It is not just that they have 
the right to refuse to be known; as a rule they have the ability as well. All 
they have to do is keep silence or lie-or engage in any of the manifold 
subterfuges by which the lowly and oppressed escape the knowledge of 
their masters. The ruling ideology may favor the rulers and be imposed 
on the ruled, yet in actual speech the latter have an ironic way of adopt-
ing it which evades the former's attempts to define the ruled in terms 
preferred by the rulers.' Persons may often appear to relinquish the 
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authority to speak for themselves, but appearances are deceiving. 
It is not always right to refuse to be known, but in this regard as in 
many others persons are free to make the wrong choices. Liars, for 
instance, choose not to make themselves known. Of course we can some-
times "see through" liars and discern what they are actually thinking, but 
this results in a piece of knowledge about a person which ought not to be 
counted as knowledge of a person. Above all, this kind of discernment 
ought not to be made the paradigm of how we know others, which is in 
effect what happens in the bad picture I mentioned at the beginning. 
This is not to say that seeing through a liar is always wrong. 
Knowledge about other persons, even of the disrespectful sort that does 
not contribute to knowledge of other persons, is sometimes just what we 
need-the way we sometimes need violence in a just cause. It is often 
good to catch a liar in his lie, just as it is good to catch a thief in the act. 
To make matters yet more complicated, we are sometimes glad to be 
caught ourselves. Here it is important to do justice to the complexity of the 
moral landscape of human relationships. For example, it can be a very 
good thing indeed when a friend of mine sees through my deceit (perhaps 
through my self-deception as well) and knows what I am really thinking. 
This piece of knowledge about me may even contribute to her knowledge of 
me--precisely because she is a friend, someone who has a history of listen-
ing to me and taking my word seriously. Indeed, it is more than likely that 
the reason she refuses to believe me is precisely because she takes my 
responsibility as a truth-teller seriously. Yet the aura of violence has not 
entirely disappeared. She may say something like, "Come on now, you 
know you don't really believe what you're saying." This has the violence of 
a rebuke: it stings, but if the rebuke is wise and well-placed it does me good. 
Of course one does not have to be a friend to know things about peo-
ple that they do not know about themselves. It is not unusual, for 
instance, for a perceptive observer to see that someone is angry before 
the angry person notices or is willing to acknowledge her own anger. 
Yet it makes a great difference whether or not that observer is a friend, 
or at least someone who can be trusted. We do not welcome such per-
ceptiveness when it belongs to someone who has no respect whatsoever 
for what we have to say about ourselves. And that is one reason why it 
makes sense to say that such perceptiveness by itself does not constitute 
knowledge of another person. 
Another kind of complexity comes into view when we turn from peo-
ple who choose not to be known to people who cannot choose to be 
known. If we cannot know persons who do not choose to make them-
selves known in what they say, what does this imply about persons who 
cannot choose to say anything? I do not mean mute people or those 
who literally cannot speak, but who succeed in communicating through 
sign-language or writing; for they are clearly capable of "saying things" 
in the requisite sense. Nor do I mean people in an irreversible coma. I 
know of no account of knowledge of other persons which would allow 
us to say we can know such persons (unless we already knew them 
before they were in the coma). This does not mean they are no longer 
persons, but simply that we can no longer come to know them as such-
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and that indeed is a large part of their tragedy. 
The most important case of persons who cannot choose to say anything 
is very young children. My proposal evidently implies that the further 
they are from the capacity for linguistic communication (the kind of com-
munication that involves semantic meaning and thus truth-bearers) the 
further they are from being known as persons. J think there is something 
right about this implication (marriage and adult friendship ought to be 
closer to our paradigm of knowing other persons than child-rearing) but 
there are some worrisome aspects as well. Ordinary children are not like 
someone in a coma; failure to perceive their personhood is not tragedy but 
moral obtuseness. Moreover, one of the things I think we can perceive 
about these immature persons is that the relations of trust which bind 
them to their parents are significantly like the kind of faith-keeping that I 
have taken as the paradigm case of knowledge of other persons. 
The proper way to accommodate this perception is to go back to the 
ethical consideration upon which my proposal is based. The fundamen-
tal claim here is what I called "the requirement of respect": that we 
should not say we know persons if we do not respect them. In the case 
of persons who can speak, this clearly means respecting what they say 
and considering whether it is true. But the case of children is different, 
because the younger they are, the less capable they are of doing that 
which demands this particular kind of respect. Thus among the many 
rights and privileges that young children do not have (voting, making 
valid contracts, various rights of self-determination, etc.) they do not in 
general have the right for their words to be taken at face value. We 
often do not take three-year-olds at their word, for instance, and this is 
usually wise. 
Nonetheless, like the children themselves, the respect we owe them 
grows over the years. We start out carrying our young within our bod-
ies and cuddling them on our breasts like many another animal; but we 
are the animal that has language,' and this means that as our offspring 
grow they can come to speak for themselves, and thus be loved and hon-
ored in quite a different way-more like the way God is loved and hon-
ored. This capacity and our corresponding respect start out imperfect 
(like all growing things) as children first learn to communicate to others 
and then learn what responsibilities their communication entails. But to 
the extent that they can communicate in a way that makes them respon-
sible for what they say, they can be known more or less as adult persons 
are. This capacity is ever on the increase, and parents nurture it by 
being faithful themselves, like their Father in heaven-thus teaching 
their children to be faithful in turn, a process that begins long before the 
little ones have uttered their first words. lO 
In this regard there is an important asymmetry. Our children know us 
before we know them. Not only do they understand adult words before 
they can speak them, but more importantly they can trust in an adult 
promise before they are trustworthy themselves. Thus while a young 
child has little capacity to make herself known in her words, her parents 
can give themselves to her to be known in their words. Therefore, in the 
mutual trust that should enfold parent and child, the child can know the 
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parent better than the parent can know the child. The deep point here is 
that it is precisely the more capable and knowledgeable person who is 
more knowable, but less able to know the other. This is what we should 
expect it as I have been suggesting, knowledge of other persons rests 
more on the power of the known to give than on the power of the know-
er to perceive. We know others by their grace, and a parent can be gra-
cious in ways that are beyond the capacity of a child. 
lV. The Knowledge of God 
My proposal is grounded on considerations of semantics (rather than 
speech-act theory or theories of dialogue) and ethics (rather than theology 
or metaphysics). With regard to the latter, it is important to be clear, for 
instance, that the topic of discussion here is other persons, not other minds. 
Accordingly, the grounds upon which I have argued are found not in the 
metaphysics of mind but in the ethics of respect for persons. Skeptical 
questions do not properly arise here, as they might in discussions of "the 
existence of other minds." Failure to perceive that other human beings are 
persons is not a theoretical problem of epistemology but a practical prob-
lem of evil: we do not call it skepticism but disrespect, bigotry, or injustice. 
Because my proposal is not grounded in premises concerning the 
nature of mind, it is relatively independent of debates on that topic, 
being compatible with a wide variety of positions from mind-body dual-
ism to the debunking view that dualist concepts of mind such as those 
which give rise to "the problem of other minds" are a mistake." Hence 
it is not to be confused with Alvin Plantinga's contention that "belief in 
other minds and belief in God are in the same epistemological boat.//12 
So far as I can see, my proposal does not commit us to believing in the 
existence of any minds at alt in the modern dualist sense required by 
"the problem of other minds." 
Nor does it commit us to the existence of God. The proposal is logi-
cally independent of theology, in that one could accept it without being 
compelled to accept any theological convictions along with it. I have 
obviously been guided by a theological paradigm in constructing it and 
also in illustrating it, but the immediate reasons I have offered for 
believing it true are not theological but ethical: we ought to regard 
believing people's words as necessary to knowing them, because if we 
pay no heed to the possibility of their words being true then we are not 
respecting them as persons. Naturally, I think this ethical position is 
supported by theologies which hold human beings to be created in the 
image of God, but I see no insuperable obstacle to it being made to stand 
on its own, should anyone care to make it do that. 
Of course given the existence of a personal God, the proposal does 
have theological implications. In conclusion let me mention two of the 
most surprising, along with my reasons for thinking them consonant 
with the Christian theological tradition. 
The first is that our knowledge of God is more certain than our 
knowledge of human persons. God is unlike us in that he always makes 
his promises wisely, never finds himself unable to keep them, and is 
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utterly faithful. We can therefore know him with more certainty, 
because his word is more trustworthy. As Paul says, let God be true and 
every human being a liar.J3 
Of course reasons to doubt God are not far to seek, if that is what we 
are looking for. Indeed we often find them without looking for them, 
being (like the prophets and the Psalmist) positively assaulted by them 
and consequently hard-pressed to tell a story of divine faithfulness. 
There is a time for complaint and lamentation and supplication. But 
unless the Christian faith is false we will eventually find that the true 
story is one in which God turns out to have kept his word. Thus in the 
end there is a kind of "seeing for ourselves" that does not go behind or 
beyond the other's word, but experiences its truth and his truthfulness. 
It is the kind of beatific vision hoped for in the theodicy of Julian of 
Norwich, who hears Christ promise, "I can make all things weiLand 
you shall see yourself that all manner of things shall be welL .. ! shall 
keep my word in all things and make all things well."!" 
Second, there is the question of how God knows us. God can see into 
our hearts, but according to my proposal this is not a way of knowing us 
as persons. Hence we have a problem, stemming from the asymmetry 
discussed above: once again, the more trustworthy person is more able to 
make himself known but less able to know the other-for knowledge of 
other persons depends on the grace of the known rather than the power 
of the knower. We in our faithlessness and sin cannot be known as truly 
and certainly as God. How then shall God know persons such as us? 
Whenever the Bible speaks of God discerning the thoughts of human 
hearts, the thought of judgement is not far away." But suppose we consider 
God's knowledge of human persons after the work of judgement is done. Is 
it not one of the motives of redemption to give an answer to our question? 
God rescues and redeems his fallen creatures, justifies and sanctifies them, 
sets them right and makes them holy, so that in the end they may speak a 
word worthy of all acceptance-even his own acceptance. Perhaps along 
with the commendation, "well done, good and faithful servant,"!6 the 
redeemed may hope also to hear God say, "well spoken, good and faithful 
servant." This is suggested by the eschatology, if I may call it that, of the 
Psalms. The same Psalmist who complains and laments before the Lord 
also vows that if God will turn from wrath, forgive his sins and restore his 
life, he will return praises and thanksgiving in the congregation of the right-
eous, telling of the greatness of the mercy of God.!? Such is the song of the 
redeemed, exulting in the lovingkindness of God, telling the story of God 
and ourselves in words that are not vain and dishonest but faithful and 
true-so that in the peaceable kingdom where wrath and sin are no more, 
the glory consists not just in our knowing God but in his knowing us. 
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NOTES 
1. The dictum has its source in Freud's own writings: ''The 'No' uttered 
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by a patient after a repressed thought has been presented to his conscious 
perception for the first time does no more than register the existence of a 
repression and its severity; it acts, as it were, as a gauge of the repression's 
strength. If this 'No,' instead of being regarded as the expression of an 
impartial judgement (of which, indeed, the patient is incapable) is ignored, and 
if work is continued, the first evidence soon begins to appear that in such a 
case' No' signifies the desired 'Yes.'" Sigmund Freud, Dora: an Analysis of a 
Case of Hysteria (New York: MacMillan, 1963), p. 76 (my emphases). 
2. This ordinary-language distinction between knowing other persons 
and knowing about them does not imply any weighty epistemological dis-
tinction between belief-in and belief-that (H.H. Price) or "I-Thou" and "I-it" 
relations (Martin Buber). Or at least I do not intend any such distinction 
thereby. So far as I can tell, knowledge of other persons is made up largely 
of pieces of knowledge about other persons that are gained in the usual 
ways: observation, inference, familiarity, etc. Like other forms of knowl-
edge, knowledge of other persons is distinctive because of the distinctive-
ness of its object-not because it has a radically different epistemological 
structure or foundation. It differs from other kinds of knowledge in being 
shaped by ethical constraints, including those that stem from the require-
ment of respect for persons. Consequently it is grounded in the word of the 
other-but this does not make it unique or sui generis, but rather brings it 
under the heading of belief in testimony (as shall be discussed further on). 
Oddly enough, the possibility that other persons might tell us the truth 
tends to be overlooked by philosophical theorists of dialogue-perhaps pre-
cisely because they are so intent on finding a form of knowledge that is sui 
generis. 
3. This is no place to enter into the epistemologists' debate about justifi-
cation, warrant, and entitlement. I shall simply assume here that having 
good reasons is sufficient for epistemic justification, and that "justified true 
belief" is a good enough account of the nature of knowledge to be used in 
support of my contention that believing the word of trustworthy people 
contributes to knowing them. 
4. These are the basic terms of the covenant in Exodus 6:7, Leviticus 
26:12, Jeremiah 31:33, Ezekiel 36:28, and Zechariah 8:8-a covenant renewed 
and fulfilled in the marriage of the Lamb and his bride, the New Jerusalem, 
in Revelation 21:3. 
5. For present purposes I treat sentences like "I wilL" as the standard 
form of a promise. I would re-phrase locutions like "I promise to ... " into the 
form "I promise that..." and count them true if and only if the that-clause is 
true (in the bald semantic sense familiar from Tarski). The point of such 
rephrasing is to avoid considerations of speech act theory (illocutionary 
force, performative function and so on) in order to concentrate on the issue 
of truth. Of course for other purposes speech-act theory remains germane, 
but my aim here is to minimize dependence on theoretical considerations 
outside of ethics. 
6. This of course is the Scriptural testimony of Mary, from the 
Magnificat, Luke 1:54f. 
7. Cf. esp. Rules for the Direction of the Mind, §§2-7. 
8. Cf. James c. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden 
Transcripts (New Haven: Yale, 1990). 
9. As Aristotle saw: d. Politics 1:2,1253a9 and 7:13,1332a5, as well as 
Rhetoric 1:1,1355b33. The phrase (2Oon logon eclLon) is usually translated 
"rational animal." 
10. Cf. Erik Erikson's classic description of "basic trust" as the earliest 
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issue that arises in human psycho-social development, in Childhood and 
Society, second edition (New York: Norton, 1963), pp. 247-25l. 
11. It may be incompatible with the project of eliminating "mentalistic" 
concepts altogether-depending of course on how exactly the elimination is 
to be accomplished. Like Ryle, I assume that our everyday talk of beliefs, 
thoughts, feelings and the like (our "folk psychology," as it has recently 
been called) is in good working order, and am persuaded that it does not 
have dualist implications. 
12. Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell, 1967), p. viii. 
13. Romans 3:4. 
14. Julian of Norwich, A Revelation of Love, edited by Marion Glasscoe 
(Exeter: University of Exeter, 1976), §3lf (my translation). 
15. Cf. e.g. Jeremiah 17:10, Matthew 12:25, Luke 16:15, 1 Corinthians 3:20, 
and esp. Hebrews 4:12f. 
16. Matthew 25:21. 
17. Cf. the conclusions of Psalms 22, 51, 54, 66, 71, and 116. 
